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After the Storm: 
The Politics of the Post-CAFTA US Trade Agenda 
 
 
 
Overview  
 
Over a year after US Trade Representative Robert Zoellick and Central American trade ministers 
signed the Central American Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA), the small, bilateral accord was 
able to squeeze through the US Congress with a close 217-215 vote in the House of 
Representatives on July 27, 2005. Congressional approval followed months of uncertainty. While 
the White House deservedly claims CAFTA as a victory, the nature of the CAFTA victory 
confirms the near-total collapse of a bipartisan trade consensus in Washington. Eleventh hour 
side deals and arm twisting made CAFTA’s passage in the House of Representatives possible. 
However, such a strategy does not bode well for future bilateral and multilateral trade 
agreements with Latin America.  
 
The current Andean Free Trade Agreement – which the US is negotiating with Colombia, 
Ecuador and Peru (with Bolivia participating as an observer) – is next on deck but even when 
negotiations are completed, it stands little chance of reaching a vote in the US Congress before 
the 2006 congressional elections in which all members of the House of Representatives and some 
Senators stand for re-election. Partisan politics is the biggest obstacle currently standing in the 
way of a more productive US trade agenda with the Americas. Constituent and sectorial concerns 
clearly block free trade. The sugar lobby, for example, contributed to congress’s challenge in 
passing CAFTA. However, bitter partisanship will continue to be the greatest challenge to 
greater free trade with the Americas in the coming period. 
 
What Went Right and What Went Wrong with CAFTA? 
 
It is nothing new for trade agreements to be a major source of contention in the US Congress. 
Free trade creates anxiety among a large sector of the American public who perceive US job loss 
as directly linked to the signing of free trade agreements. This is turn makes legislators equally 
wary.
1 The Central American Free Trade Agreement clearly provided such anxiety. One simple 
but important argument that has been made is that CAFTA quite simply rhymed with NAFTA 
(the acronym used to describe the North American Free Trade Agreement) and brought back 
memories of the battle that President Clinton had to wage within the Democratic Party to get 
NAFTA approved in the US Congress.
2  
 
As opposed to NAFTA, the market size of the six CAFTA countries (Costa Rica, El 
Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua and the Dominican Republic) is no larger than that of 
a medium-sized US city such as Columbus, Ohio or Orlando, Florida. Therefore, specific threats 
to constituents as a result of CAFTA’s implementation are minimal. Sugar and textile interest 
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groups were galvanized in the CAFTA battle, putting pressure on members of Congress from 
both sides of the aisle to reject the trade accord. This eroded CAFTA support from the 
Republican party which has a majority in both the Senate and the House of Representatives.  
 
The principle argument against CAFTA made by lead Democrats was that the 
agreement’s labor provisions were unnecessarily weak. While the agreement calls on countries to 
be held to the standards of the International Labor Organization (ILO), there is no serious 
enforcement mechanism. Democrats called on US trade negotiators to put stricter labor 
provisions in CAFTA, especially in light of Central America’s dismal labor record. Even 
Democratic presidential candidate John Kerry rejected CAFTA in May 2004 noting his 
consistent support for free trade agreements but his sense that CAFTA was a “disappointing and 
unnecessary step backwards in our nation’s efforts to ensure that opening markets results in 
higher living standards on all sides and not a race to the bottom on workers rights.”
3  
 
Beyond the specifics of labor provisions, Democrats felt that they were insufficiently 
consulted in the crafting of the CAFTA accord. Representative Charles Rangel of New York – 
the lead Democrat on the House Ways and Means Committee which has jurisdiction over US 
trade policy – argued that “the White House ignored virtually all Democrats when it negotiated 
this CAFTA.” This lack of consultation further crystallized partisan divisions on the CAFTA 
agreement in the US Congress. 
 
While key Democrats probably should have been further consulted in crafting the 
CAFTA accord, weak labor standards cannot bear full responsibility for Democrats’ rejection of 
the agreement. Much of the trade challenge in congress can be attributed to the process of 
redistricting which has made most US congressional districts either safe Democratic or 
Republican seats. As a result, real electoral contests take place in primary elections rather than in 
the elections themselves. Elected officials are thus increasingly beholden to core constituencies 
who influence their positions on trade agreements. For Democrats, this is organized labor groups 
such as the AFL-CIO.
4 Even the so-called New Democrats – a group of centrist Democrats who 
generally support free trade agreements – rejected CAFTA.  
 
A final push by the White House and the Republican majority included a rare visit by 
President Bush to Capitol Hill the day of the CAFTA vote and a number of side deals made by 
former Republican Majority Leader Tom Delay and other senior Republicans with members of 
their own party. The scenario was similar to that of the approval of trade promotion authority in 
2002 and represented a true breakdown in any semblance of a bipartisan trade consensus that 
previously existed. The good news for Central America was that CAFTA was able to squeeze 
through. The bad news for Latin America is that if a small, trade agreement with Central 
America caused such political agony, getting an Andean Free Trade Agreement or a hemisphere-
wide trade pact through the US Congress will be an even more arduous task.  
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Looking Ahead: The Andean Free Trade Agreement and Beyond 
 
The Andean Free Trade Agreement is the next logical step in the Bush administration’s current 
piecemeal approach to hemispheric trade. The US currently extends duty-free treatment to over 
half of all imports from Colombia, Ecuador, Peru and Bolivia through the Andean Trade 
Promotion and Drug Eradication Act (ATPDEA).
5 Negotiations for a more permanent free trade 
agreement between the US and Colombia, Ecuador and Peru (with Bolivia participating as an 
observer) are now underway. Those favoring such an agreement argue that ATPDEA preferences 
expire in December 2006, making it crucial to lock market access into place.  
 
Negotiations thus far have moved particularly slowly and are not expected to come to a 
conclusion anytime soon. The most contentious areas in ongoing trade negotiations are 
agriculture and intellectual property rights. C olombia, Ecuador and Peru are seeking real, 
substantive access to the US agricultural market. Even if this kind of access is negotiated in an 
Andean Free Trade Agreement, agriculture is a politically sensitive issue in the US Congress and 
one that could ultimately threaten the agreement’s approval.
6 Ensuring that cheap agricultural 
products from the US do not flood the markets of the Andean region is also essential for both 
Andean and US policymakers who do not want trade negotiations to be counterproductive to 
anti-narcotics efforts.   
 
With negotiations stagnant, an Andean trade pact will likely not face US and Andean 
legislatures anytime soon. Furthermore, US congressional elections in November 2006 will hold 
up any sort of desired, expedited approval of  an Andean trade pact. Upcoming presidential 
elections in Colombia, Ecuador and Peru could also further politicize a free trade agreement and 
will probably contribute to delays. With this in mind, it is likely that ATPDEA preferences will 
be expanded to allow for additional time for negotiation and approval of an Andean pact.  
   
  With diminishing political capital  – even within his own party  – it is unlikely that 
President Bush will be able to fight another “CAFTA-esque” battle for an Andean Free Trade 
Agreement. Partisan divisions on trade have become more locked in place than ever before. The 
Andean Free Trade Agreement will face further scrutiny as a result of US investment disputes in 
Ecuador and Peru and concerns about labor rights both of which were highlighted at hearings of 
the House Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere in October 2004 and again in April 2005. 
Agriculture, of course, will also be a serious, deal-breaking concern in the US Congress’s 
consideration of the Andean trade pact.  
 
US Trade Representative Rob Portman, however, has pledged to make the US Congress 
his number one priority in moving ahead with the US trade agenda. Portman is no stranger to 
congress having served there prior to his recent appointment. It will be essential for Portman to 
work with both Democrats and Republicans in shaping the Andean Free Trade Agreement and 
getting members of congress on board from the start and throughout the process. Yet, even with 
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such efforts at greater inclusion, an Andean Free Trade Agreement is not likely to face a vote in 
the US Congress anytime soon.  
 
 
 
Conclusions 
 
In the wake of the CAFTA battle, it seems unlikely that the Bush administration will be able to 
push through any further upcoming trade agreements with its Latin American partners in the 
short term. As a key partner in the US drug war and one of the largest recipients of US foreign 
assistance, Colombia is perhaps viewed by US policymakers and legislators more in need of a 
free trade agreement than Ecuador, Peru or Bolivia. Still, the breakdown of any semblance of a 
trade consensus in the US Congress will make even the approval of an agreement with Colombia 
difficult in the short term.  
   
  The Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) – launched in 1994 at the first Summit of 
the Americas and initially positioned for completion by January 2005 – is no longer on the radar 
screen in the US Congress. Furthermore, given the difficulties that a small trade agreement such 
as CAFTA provided for US agricultural producers, an FTAA with agricultural giants such as 
Brazil and Argentina seems in many ways politically impossible. Real compromises on 
agriculture are much more likely to come via the ongoing Doha round of the World Trade 
Organization.  
   
  The Bush administration and members of congress must now focus their attention on 
working hard to rebuild a viable bipartisan consensus on trade that cuts across party lines. 
Passing trade agreements by one or two votes is not a sustainable method. Given the agricultural 
implications of upcoming trade pacts and the Bush administration’s diminishing political capital, 
it will be hard to pull off another trade victory without ensuring enhanced participation from all 
members of congress throughout the negotiation process. This will not be an easy task for the 
administration, especially given increased political polarization and party pressures from both 
sides of the aisle. And even with such efforts, reducing trade partisanship may be impossible. 
Nevertheless, it is the only viable path for increased trade liberalization.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 